CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-STATE'S PROHIBITION AGAINST NUDE DANCING IS CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE
ITS INTEREST IN PRESERVING SOCIETAL ORDER AND MORALS IS
BOTH SUFFICIENTLY SUBSTANTIAL AND CONTENT NEUTRAL-

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991)(plurality).
The First Amendment, which provides that the government
shall not abridge the freedom of speech,' is considered by some
to be the cornerstone of all other constitutional freedoms. 2 This
fundamental protection is hardly absolute,' however, particularly
when the issue involves non-verbal or "symbolic" speech.4 The
I The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The United States Supreme Court has applied
the First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment since 1925.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). In Whitney, Justice Brandeis
eloquently stated:

Those who won our independence.., believed that freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government ....

Believing in the

power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed
silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed.
Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). See also Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (the abridgment of freedom of speech impairs
discussion and education "essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting
error through the processes of popular government"); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (freedom of speech "is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom").
3 See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.01, at
2-3 (1984) ("an absolutist position, whereby any law which for any reason and in
any degree punishes or restricts speech is said to be unconstitutional, has never
been accepted by the Supreme Court").
4 The Supreme Court first determined that "speech" included non-verbal communication in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), where the Court held
that a statute prohibiting the display of a red flag as a form of government opposition was unconstitutional. Id. at 369. Since Stromberg, the Court has held that many
types of non-verbal conduct constitute protected speech. See, e.g., United States v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2407-08 (1990) (burning of flag is protected symbolic
activity); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (flag burning is protected
under First Amendment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (limiting cam-
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Supreme Court has never afforded the same level of constitutional protection to conduct used to convey messages or ideas
that it has granted to the expression of thought through words or
"pure" speech. 5 Symbolic expression differs, by nature, from
pure speech because it has two distinct components: the message
conveyed and the act used to convey it.6 Because states retain
the right to regulate conduct through their police powers, governmental power to restrain symbolic speech extends beyond its
control over pure speech.7
The legislature's purpose for drafting the regulation determines the level of constitutional protection afforded symbolic
paign expenditures infringes candidates' First Amendment rights); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (per curiam) (peace symbol attached to
American flag deemed-protected speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (First Amendment protects the wearing of
black armbands in protest of Vietnam War); Brown v Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142
(1966) (public library sit-in is protected expression); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (flag salute held protected First
Amendment activity); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 99, 102 (1940) (picketing
is protected under First Amendment).
On the importance of non-verbal speech as a form of protected expression, see
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 589 (1974) (White, J., concurring) ("Although
neither written nor spoken, an act may be sufficiently communicative to invoke the
protection of the First Amendment."); Brown, 383 U.S. at 142 (1966) (First Amendment rights "are not confined to verbal expression [but] embrace appropriate types
of action"); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("This Court has never limited the right to speak ... to mere verbal expression.")
(citation omitted); see also FREDRICH HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 6
(1981) ("Symbolic behavior is one of the most fundamental ways in which human
beings express and fulfill themselves. Its exercise thus lies at the core of free
society.").
5 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 ("The government generally has a freer hand in
restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken
word."); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) ("We emphatically reject the
notion.., that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct . . . as [they] afford to
those who communicate ideas by pure speech.").
6 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
7 See Cox, 379 U.S. at 563. Justice Goldberg explained:
The examples are many of the application by this Court of the principle that certain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be regulated
or prohibited. The most classic of these was pointed out long ago by
Mr. Justice Holmes: "The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing panic." . . . [A]s the Court said in Giboney..... "it has never been
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed."
Id. (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949)).
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speech.' Governmental regulations aimed at suppressing the
content of speech are undisputedly subject to the strictest judicial
scrutiny and, therefore, often fail constitutional review. 9 In the
unique context of symbolic speech, determining whether heightened scrutiny applies is a challenging task because courts must
ascertain whether the state law seeks either to regulate the conduct component of the expression or to suppress the act's intended message.' °
Recently, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 1" the United States
Supreme Court considered whether nude dancing is protected
symbolic expression under the First Amendment and, if so, to
what extent the state may restrict this form of speech.' 2 In a
plurality opinion, the Court determined that, although nude
dancing is protected symbolic conduct, an Indiana anti-nudity
8 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 (regulations unrelated to suppression of free expression are subject to a less stringent standard; regulations aimed at inhibiting
speech are subject to a more demanding standard).
9 See id. at 412 (statute prohibiting flag burning designed to suppress ideas and
failed to survive strict level of scrutiny); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315, 321
(1988) (statute prohibiting display of signs in front of foreign embassy that tended
to bring that government into "public disrepute" failed under "the most exacting
scrutiny"). See also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) ("[a]bsolute
prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn
to accomplish a compelling governmental interest"); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 270 (1981) (in cases where a regulation is content-based, the government
must prove that "its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end"); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 411 (1974) (per curiam) (when prosecution is supported by regulation aimed
at expression of ideas, government's interest must be examined "with particular
care").
10 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (regulation which prohibited the burning of draft
registration certificates upheld, regardless of the fact that it resulted in an incidental hindrance of free expression, because it was not directed at the communicative
aspect of the actor's conduct); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (ordinance
prohibiting trucks which emit "loud and raucous" noises was upheld based upon
government's interest in protecting "quiet and tranquility" and because the ordinance was not directed at the "communicative aspect" of the sounds being broadcasted). In general, any government action which limits the "time, place or
manner" in which expressive activity is carried out also falls within this category
because it regulates speech without making reference to its communicative content.
See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.47, at 1087
(4th ed. 1991). For cases which discuss time, place or manner restrictions, see infra
note 77.
One commentator advocates the abrogation of the "content-based/contentneutral" analysis in favor of one which requires proof of a compelling government
interest each time the government regulates expression. See MARTIN H. REDISH,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 125-26 (1984).
1' 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (plurality).

12 See id.
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statute could be applied to regulate nude dancing. 3 The Court
concluded that a low level of scrutiny applied because the statute
was not directed at the communicative impact or content of the
dancing and the state's interest sufficiently maintained an interest
14
in preserving societal morals and order.
Respondent, The Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc., was an establishment in South Bend, Indiana, that sold alcoholic beverages and
provided "go-go dancing."' 5 Respondent, Glen Theatre, was an
adult "bookstore," also in South Bend, that offered live nude or
semi-nude dancing performances.' 6 Both proprietors wanted to
provide totally nude dancing, but Indiana's public indecency statute, which prohibited public nudity, 7 effectively required the entertainers 9to wear some covering, such as a "G-string"' 8 or
"pasties,"' while performing.2"
Respondents commenced suit in the United States District
Court of the Northern District of Indiana to enjoin enforcement
of the statute. 2 1 The respondents alleged that the prohibition
against total nudity in public places violated the First Amendment. 22 The district court granted the injunction, finding that
the regulation's prohibition of complete nudity in all contexts
13 Id. at 2460, 2461.

Id. at 2462-63.
Id. at 2458. A go-go girl is "a performer of lewd dances in strip-tease clubs."
THE JONATHAN DAVID DICTIONARY OF POPULAR SLANG 462 (1980).
16 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459. Patrons may enter a booth and insert coins into a
mechanism to view the nude performer through a glass panel for a specified period
of time. Id.
17 Indiana Code § 35-45-4-1 provides:
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits
public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the
showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of
any part of the nipple, or the showing of the covered male genitals in
a discernably turgid state.
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462 n.2 (quoting IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988)).
18 A G-string is "an abbreviated covering of the genitals worn by strip-tease
dancers." ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF SLANG AND UNCONVENTIONAL LANGUAGE 64 (8th ed. 1984).
19 Pasties are "decorated disks worn pasted over the nipples by striptease dancers." Id. at 114-15.
20 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458-59.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 2459.
14
15
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was facially overbroad. 2' The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that prior Indiana judicial
interpretations of the statute precluded an overbreadth challenge. 24 Remanding the case to the district court, the Seventh
Circuit instructed the respondents to pursue the more specific
claim that the statute violated the entertainers' rights
under the
25
First Amendment when applied to nude dancing.
On remand, the district court concluded that nude dancing
was not constitutionally protected expressive activity and rendered judgment for the State. 26 A panel of Seventh Circuit
judges reversed, holding that nude dancing was protected.2 7
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en banc and
concluded that the First Amendment provides protection for
non-obscene nude dancing, and that the application of the Indiana statute to nude dancing offended the First Amendment because the State's objective was to hinder the performer's erotic
message.28
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to de23 Id.

24 Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1986). Writing for
the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Indiana
Supreme Court appeared to limit the construction of the public indecency statute
when it held that "it may be constitutionally required to tolerate or to allow some
nudity.., when the communication of ideas is involved." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459
n. 1 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ind.
1979), appeal dismissed sub nom. Clark v. Indiana, 446 U.S. 931 and Dove v. Indiana,
449 U.S. 806 (1980)).
25 Pearson, 802 F.2d at 290-91.
26 Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414, 419 (N.D.
Ind. 1988). Specifically, the district court stated:
After viewing the proffered evidence, this court must conclude that in
light of the Indiana Supreme Court decisions, the type of dancing
these plaintiffs wish to perform is not expressive activity protected by
the Constitution of the United States. These strip tease dances are
not performed in any theatrical or dramatic context. Further, their
conduct falls squarely within the prohibitions of Indiana's Public Indecency statute, which has been found constitutional.
Id. at 419.
27 Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826, 827 (7th Cir. 1989). The
appellate court stated the following:
In substance, nude-dancing is still expression .... What we have in
this case are plaintiffs who wish to present non-obscene nude dancing
as expressive entertainment. As such, no matter how little artistic
value may be found in such performances, it is entitled to limited protection under the [F]irst [A]mendment.
Id. at 830.
28 Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1085, 1088 (7th Cir. 1990)
(en banc).
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termine whether the statute's application to nude dancing unconstitutionally infringed First Amendment freedoms.2 9 In a
plurality opinion, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, and
held that, although nude dancing was entitled to limited First
Amendment protection, Indiana's requirement that dancers wear
G-strings and pasties was justified.3 0 The plurality recognized
that the state maintained a substantial interest in preserving societal order and morals and that the legislature did not design the
statute to suppress expression. 3 1 The plurality, therefore, concluded that statutorily requiring dancers to wear pasties and Gstrings did not impermissibly infringe upon the respondents'
First Amendment rights.3 2
Although the First Amendment appears to afford absolute
protection for individual speech rights, 3 3 the Court has long held
that not all forms of expression are safeguarded.3 4 In Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire,3 5 the United States Supreme Court established
that certain classes of speech were not constitutionally protected.3 6 A jury convicted Walter Chaplinsky of violating a New
Hampshire statute by calling a city official a "damned Fascist"
and a "God-damned racketeer. ' 37 Justice Murphy, writing for a
unanimous Court, espoused that the First Amendment did not
protect such "fighting words."' 38 TheJustice added, in dicta, that
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990).
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461-63 (1991).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 2460.
33 See supra note 1.
34 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (speech which creates a "clear and present danger" that an illegal act would occur is not protected); Marianne Benevenia, Note, First Amendment
Does Not Preclude Closure of Adult Bookstore Where Illegal Activity Occurs on Premises, 17
SETON HALL L. REV. 382 (1987) (First Amendment protections are not absolute).
35 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
36 Id. at 571-72.
37 Id. at 569. Specifically, the statute stated:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to
any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place,
nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or
exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend
or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or
occupation.
Id. (citation omitted).
38 Id. at 572. Justice Murphy defined "fighting words" as those words that "by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Id. (citing ZECHARIAN CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149-50
(1941)). The fighting words doctrine has been criticized by some commentators.
See, e.g., Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q 531, 581
29
30
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other classes of speech, including obscenity, lewdness, 9 libel and
profanity,40 were likewise unprotected. 4 ' Justice Murphy opined
that such utterances were not essential parts of the communication of ideas.42 TheJustice further found that society's interest in
morality and order easily outweighed any good derived from
such words or phrases.4" Lastly, the Court concluded that the
state's police power authorized the prohibition of words likely to
instigate a breach of the peace and that the New Hampshire statute did not unnecessarily restrict otherwise protected speech.4 4
Therefore, the Court held that the legislature had narrowly
drafted the statute and that it passed constitutional scrutiny. 5
(1980) ("When considered in light of the predominant societal interest in free and
uninhibited expression, even candid and unpleasant expression, the fighting words
doctrine cannot withstand [F]irst [A]mendment scrutiny.").
39 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957). In Roth, the Court upheld a federal statute that prohibited the use of the
mails to circulate "obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy" publications. Id. at 479, 492.
Justice Brennan clearly stated that obscenity did not fall within the realm of First
Amendment protection. Id. at 485. Justice Brennan explained that only ideas possessing a minimum of redeeming social importance were guaranteed full constitutional protection. Id. at 484. The Justice ascertained that "implicit in the history of
the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance." Id. Thus, Justice Brennan concluded that art, literature and scientific works that depict sexual material receive First Amendment protection, but
"material which deals with sex ... in a manner appealing to prurient interest" do
not. Id. at 487. For a further discussion of Chaplinsky and other obscenity cases, see
MarkJ. Oberstaedt, Note, States May Proscribe the Private Possessionof Non-Obscene Child
Pornography, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 410 (1991).
40 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 56 (1988) (First Amendment does not protect false statement of fact about public figure "made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false
or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true"); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (First Amendment does not protect "false reports of matters of public interest" about private individuals if published with actual malice);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (calculated falsehoods about public officials published with "actual malice" receive no First Amendment protection).
41 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. The Court stated the following: "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act
would raise no question under that instrument." Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.

at 573. Specifically, Justice Murphy stated:
This conclusion necessarily disposes of appellant's contention that
the statute is so vague and indefinite as to render a conviction thereunder a violation of due process. A statute punishing verbal acts,
carefully drawn so as not unduly to impair liberty of expression, is not
too vague for a criminal law.
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Chaplinsky's pronouncement that the Constitution did not
protect all types of speech opened the door for the seminal case
of United States v. O'Brien,46 where the Court developed a test for
determining when non-verbal speech may be regulated.4 7 Ajury
convicted O'Brien for illegally burning his draft registration card
in protest against the Vietnam War.48 O'Brien argued that the
federal statute, which prohibited the destruction of draft cards,
was unconstitutional as applied to him because its purpose was to
abridge anti-war speech.49
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, rejected
O'Brien's argument observing that not all conduct could be labeled protected "speech" simply because the actor intended to
convey some idea. 50 When a course of conduct involved both
"speech" and "non-speech" elements, the Court explained that
incidental limitations on First Amendment rights were justified if
the government had a sufficient interest in controlling the nonId. at 574.
46 391 U.S. 367, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968).
47 Id. at 376-77. For a discussion of O'Brien, see John H. Ely, Flag Desecration:A
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484 (1975) (O'Brien test is significant but incomplete); James
R. Goodwin, Comment, Draft Card BurningDenied Symbolic Speech Protection Under Governmental Interest Rationale, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 81, 91 (1969) (the Court must not
rely solely on a valid governmental interest to abridge free speech but must also
examine the substantiality of the expressive conduct); David N. Sexton, Recent Decision, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 98, 101 (1969) ("The [O'Brien] Court has possibly
stretched to uphold the statute, and to find a substantial government interest, it
may have deferred the 'preferred position' of [F]irst [A]mendment rights.") (footnote omitted); Howard R. Green, Recent Decision, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 596, 603
(1968) ("The Court ... ignored the balancing process that has long been the controlling [F]irst [A]mendment test.").
48 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 370. The registration certificate was a two-inch by threeinch white card that specified the registrant's name, registration date, and the address and number of the Board with which the party was registered. Id. at 373.
O'Brien stated that he publicly burned the certificate "so that other people would
reevaluate their positions with Selective Service, with the armed forces, and
reevaluate their place in the culture of today, to hopefully consider [his] position."
Id. at 370. O'Brien was convicted under a provision of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, which prohibited the destruction of such certificates.
Id. The indictment specifically charged that O'Brien "willfully and knowingly did
mutilate, destroy, and change by burning ... [his] Registration Certificate . . . in
violation of [50 U.S.C. § 462(b)]." Id. In 1965, Congress amended § 462(b) to
include any person "who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in
any manner changes any such certificate." Id. (emphasis in original).
49 Id. O'Brien contended that his actions were protected symbolic speech under
the First Amendment because he was communicating his anti-war beliefs through
his conduct. Id. at 376.
50 Id.
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5
speech element. '

More specifically, the O'Brien Court set forth a four-part test
for determining when a governmental interest sufficiently justified incidental First Amendment limitations. 52 The Court
announced that a government regulation was sufficiently substantial if: (1) the government acted pursuant to its constitutional
powers; (2) the regulation furthered a substantial or important
governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest was not related to the suppression of speech; and (4) the incidental restraint on First Amendment freedom was no more than necessary
to further the governmental interest.53 The Supreme Court held
that the federal regulation in question satisfied each prong of the
test and, therefore, justified any incidental limitation on free
expression.54
51 Id. The Court noted, therefore, that O'Brien's actions were not automatically
protected simply because they embodied some communicative aspect which implicated the First Amendment. Id.
52 Id. at 377. Prior to the adoption of this four-part test, the Court employed
various terms to describe the quality of the state interest necessary to justify incidental First Amendment limitations. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438,
444 (1963) ("compelling" or "substantial"); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960) ("subordinating" or "cogent"); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945) ("paramount"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963) ("strong").
See also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 83 (1970).
53 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
54 Id. at 382. The Court recognized satisfaction of the first prong because Congress can constitutionally raise and support armies and conscript and classify manpower. Id. at 377 (citing Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755-58 (1948);
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918)). The Court found that the prohibition on destroying one's Draft Registration Certificate "serves a legitimate and substantial purpose in the system's administration," thereby satisfying the second
prong. Id. at 378. The Court opined that the third prong was satisfied because the
government's regulation was "limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's
conduct," that is, the actual destruction of the certificate and its effect on the efficiency of the Selective Service process, and was not directed at the message that
such conduct conveyed. Id. at 381-82. Finally, the Court concluded that the fourth
step of the test was satisfied because the regulation was "an appropriately narrow
means of protecting ... [the government's] interest." Id. at 382.
The Court rebuffed O'Brien's argument that the statute should fail because
Congress's "purpose" in enacting the legislation was one of suppressing dissent.
Id. at 382-83. The Court espoused that legislative motive was irrelevant provided
there was some legitimate state interest supporting the statute, and that the efficient operation of the Selective Service System satisfied that interest. Id. at 385-86.
Some commentators have suggested that the O'Brien Court, in an attempt to evade
the symbolic speech issue, incorrectly decided the case. See EMERSON, supra note
52, at 83 ("O'Brien is a serious setback for First Amendment theory."); Louis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1968) (O'Brien Court should
have considered, among other things, the understandability of the form of communication and the lack of effective alternative modes of expression).
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One year later, however, the Court demonstrated that
speech limitations were not justified if their singular purpose was
to suppress speech content.55 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 6 school officials suspended three students for wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam
War.57 Justice Fortas, writing the Court's opinion, espoused that
the students' conduct paralleled "pure speech" and, therefore,
should have been afforded "comprehensive" First Amendment
protection. 58 After determining that the armband regulation directly related to the students' attempted message,5 9 the Court
stated that it could not sustain the restriction absent a showing
that the conduct materially and substantially interfered with the
school's operation.6" Moreover, the Court pointed out that the
school's tolerance of other symbols, such as political buttons and
Nazi swastikas, further supported its conclusion that the officials
prohibited the armbands solely for the political message the armbands conveyed. 6 ' Consequently, the majority concluded that
55 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11
(1969). While Tinker did not specifically refer to the O'Brien test, the Court nonetheless stated: "the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least
without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference
with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible." Id.
56 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
57 Id. at 504. Two of the students attended high school, while a third was a
junior high school student. Id. After receiving notice of the planned protests, Des
Moines' school officials instituted a policy stating that all students wearing armbands must remove them or face suspension. Id.
58 Id. at 505-06. The majority found that the protestors were being punished
"for a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance" and that the actions of the protestors did not interfere with school work
or the rights of other students. Id. at 508. Justice Fortas stressed that mere fear of
disturbance resulting from the message conveyed by the wearing of armbands did
not justify their prohibition. Id.
59 Id. at 510-11. One commentator has noted that, while the Tinker Court did
not refer to the O'Brien test, the armband regulation would have violated O'Brien's
third prong because it was directly related to free expression. See NOWAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 10, § 16.49, at 1108 ("the regulation was not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression") (emphasis in original).
60 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)). Specifically, Justice Fortas stated: "Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start
an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this
risk." Id. at 508 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)). TheJustice did
concede, however, that the state had a valid interest in maintaining discipline. Id. at
513. Specifically, the Justice stated: "[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it,
which for any reason ... materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." Id.
61 Id. at 510-11.
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the armband regulation impermissibly infringed the students'
First Amendment rights.62
Five years later, in Spence v. Washington,63 the United States
Supreme Court expanded the protections surrounding symbolic
speech by determining that courts must consider both the communicative and non-communicative aspect of non-verbal
speech.64 A Washington court convicted Spence, a college student who affixed a peace symbol to an American flag as a form of
protest, 65 under a state statute that prohibited the placing of
figures or designs on an American flag.66
The United States Supreme Court overturned the conviction
stating that courts must consider the nature of the activity, the
environment in which the communication was made and the factual context in which it was presented before concluding whether
the constitution would protect a communication as symbolic
speech.6 7 After examining these factors, the Court determined
that Spence's conduct was communicative because he intended
his conduct to communicate an idea and because other people
62 Id. at 514. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black posited that the regulation
should be upheld because freedom of speech could not be absolute in the school
system. Id. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
554 (1965)). For further discussion of Justice Black's viewpoint on the First
Amendment, see JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Everette E.
Dennis et al. eds. 1978); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
63 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). For an in-depth discussion of Spence, see
Michael W. Hoge, Note, Flag Misuse and the First Amendment, 50 WASH. L. REV. 169
(1974).
64 Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10. This reasoning slightly deviated from the holding
in O'Brien, where the Court considered only the non-communicative aspect of
O'Brien's conduct and not the communicative aspect or motivation behind it. See
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, at 1110.
65 Spence, 418 U.S. at 406-08. Spence made the peace symbol out of black tape
attached to both sides of the flag and hung the flag upside down outside his window
in protest of the invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State killings. Id. at 406, 408.
66 Id. at 406-07. The statute provided in pertinent part:
No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or display:
(1) Place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard,
color, ensign or shield of the United States or of this state . . . or
(2) Expose to public view any such flag, standard, color, ensign or
shield upon which shall have been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to which shall have been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or
advertisement ....
Id. at 407 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9.86.020 (1977)).
67 Id. at 409-10. The Court stated: "the context in which a symbol is used for
purposes of expression is important, for the context may give meaning to the symbol." Id.
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likely understood his message. 68 Explaining that the Washington
court convicted Spence solely on the communicative aspect of his
actions, the majority reversed the conviction because the state's
interests did not survive a stringent level of constitutional
scrutiny. 69
The Court demonstrated in 1984, however, that restrictions
on non-verbal speech could still be justified if the state invoked a
sufficiently substantial interest unrelated to the speaker's
message.7 ° In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 7 a federal agency permitted a group to demonstrate the plight of the
homeless by erecting symbolic "tent cities" in two public parks.7 2
A federal regulation banning camping on park grounds, however, prohibited the demonstrators from sleeping in the tents.73
Id. at 410.
Id. at 411, 415. The Court explained the shortcomings of each state interest.
Id. at 412. The Court posited that there was nothing in the record that supported a
breach of the peace claim. Id. Moreover, the Court expounded that protecting the
sensibilities of passersby was not a sufficient interest because "the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." Id. (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592
(1969)). Likewise, the Court noted that Spence could not be punished for failing to
exhibit proper respect for the flag. Id. (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593
(1969)). As for preserving the flag as an "unalloyed symbol of our country," the
Court expostulated that, even if a legitimate state interest existed, it would be unconstitutional as applied to Spence's conduct. Id. at 412-14.
One commentator suggested that Spence represents a subtle shift from the
"speech/conduct" distinction employed in O'Brien to a general balancing of an individual's First Amendment rights versus government interests. See NOWAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 10, at 1110. For other symbolic speech cases involving the
American flag, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1988) (burning flag in protest
of Reagan administration policies is protected activity); Smith v. Goguen, 418 U.S.
566 (1974) (state could not constitutionally punish an individual for wearing a replica of the flag on the seat of his pants); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (state cannot constitutionally punish a student for failing to salute
the flag).
70 The Court originally determined that non-verbal speech may be restricted in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). For a discussion of O'Brien, see supra
notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
71 468 U.S. 288 (1984). For a comprehensive discussion of Clark, see Susan H.
Hicks, Note, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 181 (1985) and The Supreme Court, 1983 TermLeading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 216 (1984).
72 Clark, 468 U.S. at 291-92. The city's permit allowed for the presence of 20
tents accommodating 50 demonstrators in Lafayette Park and 40 tents accommodating up to 100 demonstrators in the park referred to as the Mall. Id. at 292.
73 Id. at 290-92. The statutory definition of camping was: "the use of park land
for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping activities, or making preparations to sleep ... or using any tents or ... other structure ... for sleeping." Id. at
290-91. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1983)). Camping was only allowed in areas
"designated for that purpose." Id. at 290 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1983)).
Neither Lafayette Park nor the Mall had designated camping areas. Id.
68
69
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The group claimed that the no-camping statute violated their
First Amendment right of free expression."4 The United States
Supreme Court, per Justice White, upheld the regulation both as
a reasonable "time, place or manner" restriction and as a valid
limitation on symbolic speech under O'Brien.75 While characterizing the demonstration's sleeping component as protected symbolic expression, 76 the majority declared that the time, place or
manner test applied to such conduct." Applying this standard,
the Court tolerated the camping ban as a permissible limitation
because: (1) the state did not enforce the statute to suppress the
demonstrator's message; 78 (2) the no-camping prohibition served
the state's important interest in maintaining the parks; 79 and (3)
the demonstrators could adequately communicate the plight of
the homeless by simply excluding sleeping in the park from their
strategy. 0 Noting that an O'Brien analysis produced the same
conclusion,8 ' the Court summarized that the regulation fell
within the government's constitutional power, addressed a sub74 Id. at 292. The demonstrators claimed that sleeping in the tents augmented
the message concerning the problems of the homeless. Id. at 296.
75 Id. at 293-94. The Court perceived these two areas of First Amendment jurisprudence to impose similar standards on speech regulations. Id. at 298. See United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
76 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376). TheJustice recognized
that conduct delivers a message if the actor intends to communicate that message
and the viewer understands the communicative nature of the act. Id. at 294 (citing
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
77 Id. The time, place or manner test provides that expressive activity may be
regulated if the restriction is "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech ....
serve[s] a significant government interest, and . . . leave[s] open
ample alternative channels for communication." Id. For additional cases dealing
with time, place or manner restrictions, see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 803 (1989) (city's requirement that rock and roll musicians use city-provided
equipment is a valid time, place or manner restriction); City Council of Los Angeles
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984) (city regulation banning use of
signs on public property is a valid time, place or manner restriction because the
aesthetic objectives of the city represented a substantial government interest); Saia
v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-61 (1948) (statute prohibiting use of amplification
devices without permission of police chief was invalid because it gave uncontrolled
discretion to chief). The Clark Court also noted that the criteria for determining a
regulation's validity is virtually identical whether one uses the O'Brien test or the
time, place or manner standard. Clark, 468 U.S at 298. For a discussion of O'Brien's
impact on the Clark decision, see Keith Werhan, The O'Brieningof Free Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 646-49 (1987).
78 Clark, 468 U.S. at 295.
79 Id. at 296.
80
81

Id. at 295.

Id. at 298-99. For discussion of the O'Brien test, see supra notes 46-54 and
accompanying text.
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stantial governmental interest, did not relate to the suppression
of ideas, and was narrowly tailored to further the government's
interest in park maintenance.82
More recently in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. ,83 the Court
further weakened protection for non-verbal speech by upholding
state regulation of symbolic conduct that might cause harmful
"secondary effects" in the community.84 The city of Renton enacted a zoning ordinance that restricted the location of adult
movie theaters.8 5 Respondents, who acquired two existing movie
theaters within the proscribed area for the purpose of showing
adult films, claimed the ordinance violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought a permanent injunction
against its enforcement.86 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, noted that the Renton city ordinance did not ban all adult
theaters but merely limited their permissible locations.87

Applying time, place or manner standards,88 the Renton
Court found the ordinance sufficiently content-neutral because it
was not aimed at the ideas the movies conveyed, but at the harmful "secondary effects" ' 89 that adult theaters have on the sur82 Clark, 468 U.S. at 298-99. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stated that
the camping ban was not a narrowly-tailored method of achieving the goal of maintaining the appearance of the parks. Id. at 308 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
84

Id. at 50.

Id. at 44. Specifically, "[tihe ordinance prohibited any 'adult motion picture
theater' from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single or multiplefamily dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any school." Id.
86 Id. at 45. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the permanent injunction, finding that the "ordinance did not substantially restrict First Amendment interests [and] . . . that the purposes of the
ordinance were unrelated to the suppression of free speech." Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. at 46.
85

87

Id.

Id. For a time, place or manner restriction to be valid, it must be "justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech ....
serve a significant
governmental interest, and.., leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 640, 648 (1981). For further discussion of time, place or manner restrictions,
see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
89 Id. at 47. Many commentators characterized as a drastic change in First
Amendment analysis, the shift from examining only the face of the statute to examining the motive behind the statute as well, a practice expressly prohibited in
O'Brien. See Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1924 (1989) (Renton makes "what most commentators fear is a
cursory inquiry into motive."); Philip J. Prygoski, The Supreme Court's "Secondary Effects"Analysis in Free Speech Cases, 6 COOLEY L. REV. 1, 35 (1989) ("Free speech will
continue to receive inadequate protection as long as the Court continues along the
path it charted with the secondary effects analysis in Renton"); Andrea Oser, Motiva88
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rounding community." The Court perceived the city's interest
in preserving social morals as substantial9 ' and additionally
found the ordinance narrowly tailored because it affected only
those theaters that generated unwanted secondary effects. 92 Finally, the Court pointed out that respondents could still exercise
their First Amendment rights at alternative Renton locations.9 3
Despite Renton's threatening precedent, the Court soon after
reaffirmed constitutional protection for symbolic speech in Texas
v. Johnson.94 Johnson burned an American flag to protest the policies of both the Reagan administration and some Dallas-based
tion Analysis In Light of Renton, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 344, 359 (1987) ("Any test that
hinges on the permissibility of government motivation is ripe for attack"); The
Supreme Court- Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 196 (1986) ("This reasoning
marks a startling break with traditional [F]irst [A]mendment jurisprudence.").
90 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. The Court opined that the legislature drafted the ordinance to preserve and protect the quality of life, prevent crime, and defend Renton's retail trade. Id. at 48. The Court expostulated that such zoning options
should be analyzed under conventional "time, place and manner regulations." Id.
at 49.
91 Id. at 50. In arriving at this determination, the Court stressed that Renton's
reliance on the experiences of surrounding cities, such as Seattle, which experienced the secondary effects of adult theaters, was justified and required no additional independent testing. Id. at 51-52.
92 Id. at 52. Cf Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981)
(attempt to ban all live entertainment was not narrowly tailored); Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) (statute banning all offensive material is
too broad in its scope).
93 Renton, 475 U.S. at 53. The Court noted that 520 acres, or 5% of Renton's
total land area, was not subject to the ordinance and, therefore, was still available
for adult theaters. Id. The Court also refuted respondents' argument that much of
that land was already occupied or did not provide viable theater sites by stating that
the "respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market ....
."Id. at 54.
In a stinging dissent, Justice Brennan stated:
The fact that adult movie theaters may cause harmful "secondary"
land-use effects may arguably give Renton a compelling reason to regulate such establishments; it does not mean, however, that such regulations are content neutral. Because the ordinance imposes special
restrictions on certain kinds of speech on the basis of content, I cannot
simply accept, as the Court does, Renton's claim that the ordinance
was not designed to suppress the content of adult movies.
Id. at 56-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94 491 U.S. 397 (1989). For further discussion of Johnson, see Eric A. Isaacson,
The Flag Burning Issue: A Legal Analysis and Comment, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 535 (1990);
Deborah T. Eversole, Note, A Voyage Through Murky Waters: Assessing Flag Misuse
Prohibitionsin the Wake of Texas v. Johnson, 17 FLA. ST. L. REV. 869 (1990). See also
Kent Greenwalt, O'er the Land of the Free: Flag Burning as Speech, 37 UCLA L. REV.
925, 947 (1990) ("[T]he Supreme Court did well in Johnson not to carve out an
exception from ordinary [F]irst [A]mendment principles."); Arnold H. Loewy, The
Flag-BurningCase: Freedom of Speech When We Need It Most, 68 N.C. L. REv. 165, 175
(1989) ("The Supreme Court has struck a major blow for freedom in Johnson.").
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companies. 9 5 A Texas state jury found Johnson guilty of violating a state statute that prohibited "the desecration of a venerated
object."' 9 6 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Johnson's conviction,
holding that the statute violated the First
97
Amendment.
After reviewing relevant precedent regarding non-verbal
speech,9 8 Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the United
States Supreme Court, stated that the First Amendment protected Johnson's flag burning because Johnson intended to convey an opinion understandable by all who witnessed his
conduct. 9 9 The Court maintained that Texas's proposed interest
95 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399. The protest took place in 1984 on the steps of Dallas
city hall during the Republican National Convention. Id. While the protestors did
not injure anyone, numerous witnesses stated that the protestor's actions gravely
offended them. Id.
96 Id. at 400. Section 42.09 of the Texas penal statutes provided:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, 'desecrate' means deface, damage, or
otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his
action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (1989).
97 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 400 (citing Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988) (en banc)).
98 Id. at 403-04. Justice Brennan articulated that the Court must first determine
whether Johnson's activity was expressive conduct which implicated the First
Amendment. Id. (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974)). If
the conduct was indeed expressive, Justice Brennan posited that the Court must
then determine whether the legislature designed the law to suppress the expression
of ideas. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974)). If the statute did not relate to the
suppression of expression, theJustice opined that it would be subject to the O'Brien
test. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)). Conversely, if the statute was directly related to the suppression of expression, the Justice declared that the state's interest must be subject to strict scrutiny. Id. (citing
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974)). Finally, theJustice opined that a
state interest not supported by the record must be discounted all together. Id. (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974)). The Court dismissed
Texas's interest in avoiding breaches of the peace as not viable because the record
did not support it. Id. at 407-08. The Court emphasized that an expressive
message can not be stymied simply because it may provoke violence in those to
whom it is communicated. Id. at 408-09 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,
4 (1949)).
99 Id. at 404-06 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court never hesitated in previous cases to find
expressive activity in flag-related conduct. Id. at 404-05 (citing Spence v. Washing-
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in preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity and nationhood was directly related to the suppression of speech. 00
Consequently, the majority determined that the statute must be
subject to the highest degree of constitutional scrutiny.' 0 ' Because the state's recognized interest in preserving the American
flag did not justify criminal sanctions, the Court concluded
that
02
the statute failed close First Amendment scrutiny.1
ton, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 632 (1943); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931)). The Court
also stated that Johnson's decision to burn his flag with the convening of the Republican National Convention added credibility to the conclusion that his conduct
was expressive. Id. at 406.
100 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410. Specifically, the majority stated:
The State, apparently, is concerned that such conduct will lead people
to believe either that the flag does not stand for nationhood or national unity, but instead reflects other, less positive concepts, or that
the concepts reflected in the flag do not in fact exist, that is, that we
do not enjoy unity as a Nation. These concerns blossom only when a
person's treatment of the flag communicates some message, and thus
are related "to the suppression of free expression" within the meaning of O'Brien.
Id.
101 Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
102 Id. at 420. Justice Brennan went so far as to suggest that permitting flag burning as a form of expression might actually strengthen, rather than weaken, national
reverence for the flag as a national symbol. Id. at 419. The Justice eloquently
remarked:
It is the Nation's resilience, not its rigidity, that Texas sees reflected in
the flag-and it is that resilience that we reassert today. The way to
preserve the flag's special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are
wrong ....
If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." We can
imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving
one's own, no better way to counter a flag, burner's message than by
saluting the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity
even of the flag that burned than by ... according its remains a respectful burial.
Id. at 419-20. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring)).
In dissent, ChiefJustice Rehnquist opined that state regulation of flag burning
did not violate the First Amendment because "[t]he flag is not simply another 'idea'
or 'point of view' competing for recognition in the marketplace of ideas." Id. at 429
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In addition, the ChiefJustice stated that the burning
of the flag so inherently inflamed many citizens that it necessarily created breaches
of the peace and made the burner's actions similar to the "fighting words" proscribed in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. Id. at 431 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)(citing
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
As a result of Johnson, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989,
criminalizing the conduct of any person who "knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon" an Ameri-
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Most recently, the Court considered the boundaries of First
Amendment symbolic-speech rights regarding nude dancing in
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 103 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing a
plurality opinion, began by recognizing the respondent's symbolic speech as constitutionally protected expressive conduct. 4
The Chief Justice qualified this protection, however, by positing
that nude performances approached
the border between pro10 5
tected and unprotected speech.

Chief Justice Rehnquist next set forth the Court's two-part
inquiry: 1) what level of First Amendment protection to afford
nude dancing; and 2) whether the Indiana regulation impermissibly encroached on protected symbolic speech. 10 6 Consequently,
the plurality applied the four-part United States v. O'Brien standard.'0 7 Applying steps one and two of the O'Brien test concurrently, the plurality examined the state's purpose in passing the
public indecency statute.' 0 8 Although Indiana statutes did not
set forth a legislative history, the plurality explained that the public indecency statute's text and history clarified the state's intent
can flag. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2407 (1990) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1990)). In Eichman, however, the Court held the Act unconstitutional. Id. at 2410. While the new Act did not explicitly contain any contentbased limitations, the Court nonetheless held that the government's interest clearly
"related to the suppression of speech." Id. at 2408 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 410 (1989)).
103 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
104 Id. at 2460. In making this determination, the Court relied on both Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975) ("Although ... nude dancing may involve
only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v.
LaRue that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First... Amendment
protection under some circumstances.") (citation omitted) and Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 ("[N]ude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation."). Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460. See also
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1972) (while nude dancing is not without First Amendment protection, the state can use the Twenty-First Amendment to
ban nude dancing as part of its liquor licensing program); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153, 161 (1974) ("[Njudity alone is not enough to make material legally obscene .... ").
105 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
106 Id. The plurality explained that the Indiana regulation proscribed all public
nudity, not nude dancing in particular. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist added that the
Supreme Court of Indiana, in its interpretation of the statute, found a prohibition
against nudity in all places of "public accommodation." Id.
107 Id. at 2460-63. The State suggested that the Court consider Indiana's law as a
time, place or manner restriction, but the plurality observed the similarity between
this approach and an analysis under symbolic speech law and opted to apply the
O'Brien test instead. Id. at 2460. For a discussion of the four-part O'Brien test, see
supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
108 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461-62.
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to protect morality and societal order. 10 9 The plurality further
explained that the common law considered public nudity a crime
and an act malum en se. 1" 0 Public indecency statutes, the plurality
stressed, cast moral disapprobation on those who wished to appear nude in public places."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that the Indiana legislature had previously passed numerous other laws prohibiting all
public nudity. "t 2 Moreover, the Chief Justice pointed out that
the public indecency statute-a general prohibition-predated
the genesis of the respondents' nude barroom dancing." 3 Thus,
the plurality concluded that the statute easily satisfied the first
prong of the O'Brien test because the state's interest in protecting
morals and societal order fell squarely within its constitutional
power. 114 Likewise, the plurality found the prong fulfilled because the state's interest was substantial and the legislature furthered that interest through the statute's enactment.' I'
Shifting to the test's third prong, the plurality characterized
Indiana's interest in morality and societal order as "unrelated to
the suppression of free expression."" ' 6 The plurality refuted the
respondents' argument that any morally based prohibition of
nudity must necessarily be related to expression or that the statute purposely censored the erotic message that nude dancing
conveyed.' 17 Supporting this determination, the plurality
charged that while almost all conduct, including unclad public
appearances, may be expressive, the Court had long rejected
109 Id. at 2461. The Court noted the ancient origin and the common existence of
public indecency statutes. Id. The Court also stressed that such statutes prevailed
in almost all fifty states. Id.
110 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461 (citation omitted). Malum en se means "a wrong in
itself; an act or case involving illegality from the very nature of the transaction,
upon principles of natural, moral, and public law." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 965
(6th ed. 1990).
111 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2462. The Court referenced Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 61 (1973) ("legislature could legitimately ...protect 'the social interest in order and morality' ") and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) ("The law,
however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing
essentially moral choices are to be invalidated . . .the courts will be very busy indeed."). Barnes, 111 S.Ct. at 2462.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 2462-63. For a discussion of Justice White's dissenting argument, see
infra notes 152-73 and accompanying text.
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such an elastic definition of "expressive conduct.""' Moreover,
the plurality pointed out that numerous other erotic performances continued free from state interference so long as the performers wore at least scant amounts of clothing." 9 The plurality
added that G-strings and pasties did not eliminate the dancer's
120
erotic message; they merely made the message less graphic.
The plurality stressed that the public indecency statute attempted
to forestall the true evils of public nudity, whether that nudity
21
intermingled with expressive activity or not.'
Applying 0'Brien's final prong, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that Indiana narrowly tailored its statute by requiring
the "bare minimum" necessary to accomplish the state's goals,
i.e., that dancers wear pasties and G-strings. t 22 The plurality
therefore concluded that the statute's incidental limitations
on expressive
activity did not violate First Amendment
3
protections. 12

In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed to uphold the
public indecency statute but did so on the conviction that nude
dancing was not even protected expressive conduct under the
First Amendment. 124 Justice Scalia opined that the statute escaped First Amendment scrutiny because it was a general prohibition regulating conduct rather than a specific law aimed at
regulating expression. 125
118 Id. at 2462. The Court bolstered this claim by quoting both United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("We cannot accept the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labelled 'speech' whenever the person engaging
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.") and Dallas v. Stanglin, 490
U.S. 19, 25 (1989) ("It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every
activity a person undertakes .. .but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the
activity within the protection of the First Amendment."). Barnes, 111 S.Ct. at 2462.
119 Id. at 2463.
120 Id.
121 Id. The plurality supported this conclusion by making reference to O'Brien.
Id. The O'Brien Court concluded that,.although O'Brien's act of burning his draft
card did contain a protected communicative element, he could nonetheless be convicted based on the non-communicative aspect of his conduct. Id. (citing United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968)). Similarly, while the Barnes Court conceded that nude dancing contained a communicative element, it nonetheless prohibited this conduct because of the non-communicative act of nudity. Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Barnes, 111 S.Ct. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring).
125 Id. Justice Scalia reminded: "Indiana does not regulate dancing. It regulates
public nudity .... Almost the entire domain of Indiana's statute is unrelated to
expression, unless we view nude beaches and topless hot dog vendors as speech."
Id. at 2464 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904
F.2d 1081, 1120 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). Justice Scalia fur-
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Attacking the dissent's position, Justice Scalia asserted that
no person may constitutionally do whatever he or she pleases as
long as no one is injured or offended. 12 6 Indeed, the Justice
commented that the public indecency statute would likely be violated if 60,000 fully consenting adults gathered in the
Hoosierdome to flaunt their genitals, even though the activity did
not offend anyone present. 27 Justice Scalia explained that
throughout history societies have prohibited certain conduct, not
because it brings about harm to others, but because society considers the conduct immoral.' 28 Justice Scalia asserted that, absent distinct constitutional protection for the conduct involved,
the Constitution did not forbid these prohibitions solely because
they regulated morality. 29 Justice Scalia posited that the Indiana
statute enforced the customary moral belief that people should
not indiscriminately expose their private parts, whether or not it
offended those who viewed the exhibition. 30 Consequently, the
Justice concluded that the public indecency statute
did not fall
3
1
protection.1
Amendment
First
of
ambit
the
within
In support of his claim, Justice Scalia distinguished written
and oral speech from expressive conduct.13 2 The Justice noted
that the First Amendment invariably protected speech and that
any law hindering speech, even if unrelated to the suppression of
expression, must meet high First Amendment scrutiny.13 3 On
the other hand, the Justice emphasized that nearly all laws rether noted that the statute does not proscribe messages of eroticism; it merely proscribes public nudity. Id.
126 Barnes, Ill S. Ct. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurring). The dissent contended that
the statute's application was unjustified because only consenting, adult customers
viewed the performances; therefore, the activity did not harm the public at large.
See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
127 Id.
128 Id. See IRVING KRISTOL, ON THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA IN AMERICA 33 (1972)
("Bearbaiting and cockfighting are prohibited only in part out of compassion for
the suffering animals; the main reason they were abolished was because it was felt
that they debased and brutalized the citizenry who flocked to witness such
spectacles.").
129 Barnes, Ill S. Ct. at 2465 (Scalia,J., concurring). See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (private homosexual sodomy prohibited solely because the
majority of the population believed it was immoral and unacceptable); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (fact that adult theatre would only cater
to consenting adults does not curtail the state's power to regulate).
130 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurring).
13 Id. at 2468 (Scalia, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurring).
133 Id. at 2465-66 (Scalia,J., concurring) See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44
(1976) (placing limit on amount of money electoral candidates may spend on campaigns must meet high level of scrutiny); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560
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strict conduct and that a person may perform virtually any prohibited conduct as a means of expressing one's self-even if the
actor simply expressed that he or she disagreed with the prohibition.' 3 4 Consequently, Justice Scalia considered it inherently unreasonable to require every law that regulated conduct to possess
a substantial state interest or survive First Amendment scrutiny
3 5
simply because the law incidentally restricted expression.1
Moreover, the Justice questioned the plurality's application
of an intermediate level of scrutiny because it required thejudiciary to determine which state interests were important or substantial. 3 6 Instead, when a regulation does not target speech
directly, Justice Scalia indicated that the Court should employ a
less-stringent "rational basis" test, particularly when the issue involves morality. 1 37 In this case, the Justice concluded that moral
(1948) (city's proscription of sound amplification devices except with permission of
police chief violates First Amendment).
134 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 (Scalia, J., concurring). See, e.g., South Florida Free
Beaches, Inc. v. Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 609 (11 th Cir. 1984) (sunbathers appeared
nude in protest of a regulation restricting public nudity).
135 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 (Scalia, J., concurring). While conceding that
strictly content-based restrictions are unconstitutional, the Justice stressed that the
Constitution permits incidental restrictions of expression resulting from regulations not aimed at the communicative aspect of conduct. Id. Compare Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (regulation prohibiting flag burning deemed
unconstitutional because it was aimed at the communicative aspect of the act);
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (statute which banned defacing of
the American flag struck down because it was related to the act's communicative
message) and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
511 (1969) (school's prohibition on wearing symbolic black armbands was unconstitutional because it was aimed at the student's communicative message) with
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-89 (1985) (prohibiting an individual
from entering a military base was constitutional because he was not banned for the
communicative nature of his act, but because he previously had been banned from
the base); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)
(ban on sleeping in parks upheld because of governmental interest in maintaining
park, not because of any opposition to the communicative impact of the act) and
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (law prohibiting destruction of
draft card upheld because it was not aimed at the act's communicative impact, but
at its non-communicative element). Specifically, Justice Scalia stated:
All our holdings . . . support the conclusion that "the only First
Amendment analysis applicable to laws that do not directly or indirectly impede speech is the threshold inquiry of whether the purpose
of the law is to suppress communication. If not, that is the end of the
matter so far as First Amendment guarantees are concerned; if so, the
court then proceeds to determine whether there is substantial justification for the proscription."
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2467 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 2467-68 (Scalia,J., concurring). To support this assertion,Justice Scalia
made reference to Bowers, where the Court held that a rational basis sufficiently
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public nudity satisfied a rational-basis

standard.

Justice Souter, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed with
the plurality's view that the First Amendment afforded nude
dancing some protection and reasoned that nude dancing conveyed an expressive message of eroticism.' 39 The Justice likewise
agreed that application of the four-step O'Brien test appropriately
determined the level of First Amendment protection. ,40 TheJustice explained, however, that the state's interest in censuring
nude dancing was not limited to protecting societal morals, but
also included combatting the "secondary effects" of establishments such as Glen Theater and the Kitty-Kat Lounge.141 Justice

Souter insisted that secondary effects should not be ignored simply because the state legislature and the courts failed to pronounce these effects as a justification for regulation. 142 The
Justice advanced that Indiana's interest in preventing secondary
effects, such as sexual assault, prostitution and other criminal activity sufficiently justified enforcement of the public indecency
statute. 143

Applying the O'Brien test, Justice Souter noted that the
state's constitutional power encompassed the prerogative to prevent the evils associated with secondary effects and easily satisfied the first prong. 1 44 Addressing the second prong, Justice
Souter offered that the state's substantial interest in preventing
secondary effects indicated that a complete
prohibition against
45
nude dancing could further that interest.
supported a law prohibiting private homosexual sodomy, and that moral opposition to homosexuality provided that rational basis. Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick,

478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)).

Id.
Id. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter explained that nudity by
itself expressed nothing except the view that the condition is somewhat suitable to
the circumstances. Id. When nudity merged with expressive activity, however, the
Justice asserted that the state of being nude added to the force of expression, and
that the activity be afforded some level of First Amendment protection. Id.
140 Id. For a discussion of the four prongs of the O'Brien test, see supra notes 5254 and accompanying text.
141 Barnes, I l I S. Ct. at 2468-69 (Souter, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Souter wrote: "Our
appropriate focus is not an empirical enquiry into the actual intent of the enacting
legislature, but rather the existence or not of a current governmental interest in the
service of which the challenged application of the statute may be constitutional."
Id. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
143 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring).
'44 Id.
145 Id. To support his assertion that the regulation at issue actually furthered the
138

139
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The statute satisfied O'Brien's third prong, Justice Souter expounded, because Indiana's interest in combatting secondary effects was unrelated to the suppression of expression. 146 Justice
Souter declared that while nude dancing establishments produced harmful secondary effects, "the persuasive effect of the expression inherent in nude dancing" did not necessarily cause the
effects.' 4 7 Rather, the Justice suggested a correlation between
the effects and the presence of nude dancing establishments
without revealing the exact reasons for the correlation. 14 8 Because Indiana's interest stemmed from the superficial correlation
between the dance and other evils, and not specifically from the
dance's persuasive effect, Justice Souter stressed that the state's
interest remained unrelated to the suppression of expression.' 4 9
Addressing O'Brien's final prong, Justice Souter noted that
the government's interest necessitated the minimum action-the
donning of a G-string and pasties. 150 The Justice concluded,
therefore, that the O'Brien test was satisfied and that the public
state's interest in preventing secondary effectsJustice Souter pointed out that Indiana was not required to justify its restrictions with a specific study of how nude
dancing would adversely impact its cities. Id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)). Instead, theJustice posited that the state may rely
on the experiences of other states where the toleration of nude dancing led to the
secondary effects Indiana sought to prevent. Id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986)). Because Indiana need not present localized
proof, the Justice concluded that the prohibition against nude dancing furthered
the state's interest in preventing secondary effects and, consequently, satisfied the
second prong of O'Brien. Id. at 2470 (Souter, J., concurring). For a further discussion of the "secondary effects" justification, see supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
146 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2470 (Souter, J., concurring).
147 Id.
148 Id. (emphasis added). Specifically, the Justice stated:
It is possible, for example, that the higher incidence of prostitution
and sexual assault in the vicinity of adult entertainment locations results from the concentration of crowds of men predisposed to such
activities, or from the simple viewing of nude bodies regardless of
whether those bodies are engaged in expression or not. In neither
case would the chain of causation run through the persuasive effect of
the expressive component of nude dancing.
Id. at 2470-71 (Souter,J., concurring).
149 Id. at 2471 (Souter, J., concurring). In furtherance of this point, Justice Souter compared Barnes to Renton. Id. In Renton, the Court held that the regulation of
adult theaters based on a correlation between such theaters and harmful secondary
effects was content-neutral because it was 'justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech." Id. (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41, 48 (1986)). Contra Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (statute prohibiting
the display of signs in front of a foreign embassy that tended to bring public disrepute to foreign government not considered content-neutral).
150 Barnes, 111 S.Ct. at 2471 (Souter, J., concurring).
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5
indecency statute should stand.' '

Justice White, in a stinging dissent, disagreed with the plu-

1 52
Jusrality and both concurrences in several material respects.

tice White argued that all previously upheld speech restrictions
aimed at protecting societal order and morals involved truly general prohibitions of individual conduct. 5 3 In that respect, the
dissent distinguished the Indiana statute because it did not apply
to nudity at all times or in all places.' 54 Moreover, Justice White
cited an Indiana Supreme Court decision that held that the public indecency statute permitted "nudity as a part of some larger
protection when the communication
form of expression meriting
1 55
of ideas is involved."'

Because the public indecency statute did not proscribe all
conduct generally, Justice White maintained that a mere interest
in furthering morality and societal order did not sufficiently justify the prohibition. 56 Instead, the dissent required a closer examination of the statute's purpose. 57 The dissent observed that
the purpose of banning public nudity in such places as beaches,
parks and hot dog stands was to shield others from what many
people find offensive. 15 Justice White reasoned that this argument could not justify the prohibition of nude dancing, however,
because all of the viewers were consenting adults who paid to eye
the performances. 159 Instead, the dissent suggested that Indiana
purposely attempted to shield patrons from what the state per151 Id.
152 Id. at 2471-76 (White, J., dissenting).
'53 Id. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting). Specifically, the Justice pointed to United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which prohibited the destruction of draft registration certificates "at any time and in any place," and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), where a state proscribed homosexual sodomy regardless of where
it took place, including in the home. Id.
154 Barnes, I I I S. Ct. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting). Particularly, the Justice referred to at-home nudity as an example of what the Indiana statute left uncovered.

Id.
155 Id. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580
(Ind. 1979)). The dissent further noted that Indiana would not apply the public
indecency statute to theatrical productions such as Hair or Salome, and that the state
never attempted to apply the statute to ballets, plays or operas that involved nudity.

Id.
156 Id.

157 Id. Specifically, Justice White articulated: "In other words, when the state enacts a law which draws a line between expressive conduct which is regulated and
nonexpressive conduct of the same type which is not regulated, O'Brien places the
burden on the State to justify the distinctions it has made." Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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ceived as the harmful message communicated through nude
dancing.' 60 Thus, the dissent concluded that the statute did not
satisfy O'Brien's third prong because Indiana's interest directly
suppressed expression. 161
Expanding on this conclusion, Justice White reasoned that
because the state allowed dancers wearing G-strings and pasties
to perform, but prohibited totally nude dancing, the state clearly
attempted to ban the distinctive message conveyed by nude dancing. 162 Indiana attempted to proscribe nude dancing, the dissent
contended, because nude performances may breed emotions and
feelings of sensuality and eroticism in the viewers' minds which
could lead to increased degradation of women and prostitution. 16 3 Because generating ideas, emotions and thoughts "is the
essence of communication," the dissent did not accept the state's
justification. 64
Justice White further noted that the nudity component of the
dancers' performances could not be categorized "as mere 'con65
duct' independent of any expressive component of the dance." 1
Because the public indecency statute aimed directly at the expression nudity conveyed, Justice White stressed that the Court
could only uphold a strictly drawn statute that satisfied a compelling state interest.166 The dissent articulated that the state established no such compelling interest to support the public
indecency statute.167 Moreover, even if a compelling interest existed, Justice White maintained that the Indiana statute remained
6
unconstitutional because the law was not narrowly tailored.

1

Id.
Id. at 2473-74 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). Thus, the dissent
advocated a content-based treatment of the public indecency statute. See supra note
22 and accompanying text. The dissent further noted that the case should be decided based on settled law, not the artistic value of nude dancing. Id. at 2474-75
(White, J., dissenting). The plurality's opinion that nude dancing was not a high art
should excuse ignoring or disturbing settled law. Id. at 2474 (White,J., dissenting).
See also Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1988) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.").
167 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2475 (White, J., dissenting).
168 Id. Justice White posited that prohibiting an entire class of expressive activity
generally does not meet the narrow tailoring requirement of the First Amendment.
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
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Attacking Justice Souter's position, the dissent opined that if increased prostitution and other secondary effects truly concerned
Indiana, the state should adopt restrictions that did not clash
with the expressiveness of the nude dancing performances.169
170
Attacking Justice Scalia's "Hoosierdome" hypothetical,
Justice White pointed out that the same 60,000 individuals who
would be violating the public indecency statute while nude within
the Hoosierdome would not be violating the law if they drove to
their respective homes and, once there, paraded around, ca17 1
vorted and reveled in the nude before friends and relatives.
Justice White found no reason why Indiana's interest in morality
should diminish when the conduct occurred in private, especially
1 72
if nudity was as inherently evil as Justice Scalia suggested.
In conclusion, Justice White reiterated his position that Indiana prohibited nude dancing solely for the message that it communicated; therefore, the statute creating the prohibition was
73
unconstitutional. 1
In Barnes, the plurality applied symbolic speech law in a result-oriented and troubling manner. By justifying the Indiana
regulation, the plurality protected society from the "evils" of
risque, but non-obscene, expression. Unfortunately, the Court
enforced its mores at the expense of well-rooted First Amendment protections.
The plurality's characterization of the Indiana statute as content-neutral is flawed for numerous reasons. First, the plurality
exceeded its judicial function by stepping into the role of the legislature. In examining whether a particular statute intentionally
suppresses speech, the Court must determine the legislative purpose underlying the regulation. 74 Because the Indiana legislaId. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (complete ban on picketing
of homes upheld only because it targets no more than the precise source of the evil
it seeks to redress).
169 Barnes, 11l S. Ct. at 2475 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent suggested that
the state could limit nude dancing to certain hours, disperse the establishments
throughout the city or require patrons to remain a minimum distance from the
performers. Id. The dissent further stated that Indiana could have appropriately
invoked its Twenty-First Amendment powers as a means of regulating nude dancing. Id. (citations omitted). Finally, the dissent noted that the state had the power
to criminalize obscene behavior and prostitution. Id.
170 For a discussion of this hypothetical, see supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
171 Barnes, Ill S. Ct. at 2471-76 (White, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 2476 (White, J., dissenting).
173 Id.
174 Through examination of the legislative purpose, the Court determines
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ture did not articulate the governmental interest supporting its
public indecency statute, Justice Rehnquist determined that the
lawmakers designed the statute to preserve societal order and
morals. 7 5 The Justice, however, should have used more objective factors in determining Indiana's purpose, rather than imposing his personal opinion about the goal of regulating public
76

nudity. 1

The Indiana Supreme Court's interpretation of the public indecency statute clearly reveals that the legislature did not intend
to suppress nudity in all artistic performances.' 77 Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the public indecency statute was not
aimed at the erotic message inherent in nude dancing, but rather
at all public nudity.' 78 By contrast, the Indiana Supreme Court
stated that the statute allowed nudity "as a part of some larger
form of expression where the communication of ideas is involved."' 79 Additionally, the petitioner admitted that theatrical
performances involving nudity, such as Hair or Salome, would not
violate the statute.""° It is difficult to dispute the argument that
the state sought to prohibit nude dancing not for nudity alone,
but because nudity conveys an erotic message. 18 1 Certainly, individuals who undress in gymnasium locker-rooms, models who
bare all in art classes or parents who allow young children to
frolic naked would all violate the public indecency statute. The
state would not likely prosecute these individuals, however, because nudity in these instances does not convey a communicative
message that the state deems harmful.
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist's rationalization that
semi-clothed, erotic performances equaled nude erotic performances exposes his difficulty with the message conveyed by nude
dancing. 8 2 The Chief Justice articulated: "the requirement that
whether the statute in question is content-based or content-neutral. See supra notes
9-10 and accompanying text.
175 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
176 It is true that "[plublic indecency statutes ... are of ancient origin" and that
this particular Indiana statute follows a "long line" of public indecency statutes. Id.
Nowhere, however, in the Indiana statutes is the purpose of protecting morality
articulated. See id.
177 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459 n.l (citing State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580, 587
(Ind. 1979)).
178 Id. at 2463.
179 Id. at 2459 n.l (citing State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ind. 1979)).
180 Id. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting).
181 For the dissent's discussion of this argument, see supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
182 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
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the dancers don pasties and a G-string does not deprive the
dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the
message slightly less graphic."'' 8 3 Facially, this statement indicates that the message conveyed by nude dancing concerns both
the state and the Court, thus making the statute content-based
and demanding of a strong level of judicial scrutiny-a level that
a mere interest in societal order and morals leaves unsatisfied.
Finally, even if one assumes a content-neutral public indecency statute, the interest in preserving morality does not sufficiently justify First Amendment restrictions. If the logic of the
Barnes plurality is extended there comes the danger that any form
of expression advocating a shift from the views of the moral majority will be suppressed.

8 4

Justice Scalia's position is even more disturbing. Justice
Scalia's declaration that any law not explicitly aimed at expression does not warrant a de minimis amount of First Amendment
protection 85 sets dangerous precedent. A crafty legislature
could draft a statute that is not facially aimed at conduct, but
nonetheless suppresses that communicative component through
application. 8 6 While every "incidental" hindrance of First
Amendment freedom need not pass First Amendment scrutiny,
the Court must recognize that not all hindrances are incidental.
The Court, at a minimum, must explore the statute to determine
if any First Amendment restrictions are truly incidental.
Id.
See Stuart Taylor Jr., 1st Amendment Peril. Bad Issues Making Worse Law, 128 N.J.
L.J. 1334 (1991), which noted:
[if its logic is extended, Barnes could prove to have broad implications, for majoritarian morality has not previously been held to be a
sufficiently compelling state interest to justify restrictions on speech.
A great deal of expressive conduct with a weightier claim to First
Amendment protection than nude dancing can also give offense to
majoritarian morality and might be threatened if the Court were to
balance the value of particular expression against state interests in order and morality.
Id.
185 Id. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring).
186 See Oser, supra note 89, at 359. The author stated:
[S]uppose that a statute forbidding all parades on the first day of
every month was passed because the legislature wanted to prevent
people from hearing pro-socialist opinions on May Day. Such a law
would have been subject to balancing, despite the fact that the government regulation strikes at the First Amendment's core. The content test tempts a legislature with illicit motives to sneak a view-point
restriction by the courts in the form of a content-neutral regulation
and is therefore under-inclusive.
Id. (footnote omitted).
183
184
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By shifting the state's interest from societal order and morals
to that of preventing harmful secondary effects, 8 7 Justice Souter
concededly proffered an interest which would more likely pass
judicial scrutiny. Admittedly, preventing sexual assault, prostitution and other crimes creates a strong state interest. Although
direct proof that such transgressions will occur is lacking, this interest is nonetheless more viable than a subjective interest in morality. This does not mean, however, that Justice Souter's
disposition of the case is acceptable.
First, Justice Souter, not the Indiana legislature, created the
state interest in the prevention of secondary effects. Thus, the
same objectivity problems that plagued Chief Justice Rehnquist's
analysis also plague Justice Souter's argument.' 88 Additionally,
prevention of secondary effects as ajustification for inhibiting expressive speech is problematic and has been widely criticized.' 8 9
Indeed, legislators can circumvent the Court's strict review by
cloaking their content-based regulations in "secondary-effects"
clothing. 90 Individuals wishing to partake in free expression
should not have to concern themselves with every possible effect
their conduct causes.
In summary, the Court must place a greater emphasis on
First Amendment rights than on the states' governmental interests asserted to suppress those rights.' 9 ' Indeed, the Court must
erect greater protection of First Amendment rights and develop a
test recognizing their significance. 92 Free expression must
Id. at 2468-69 (Souter, J., concurring).
For criticism of Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis, see supra note 184 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
334 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("I write separately . . . to register my continued disagreement with the proposition that an
otherwise content-based restriction on speech can be recast as 'content-neutral' if
the restriction 'aims' at 'secondary effects' of the speech .....
190 See Note, supra note 89, at 1923, which stated:
[T]o avoid strict scrutiny, legislators could always defend a regulation
as a means of preventing a litany of secondary effects that any large
scale expressive activity in a public forum would produce - such as
interference with pedestrian and automobile traffic, or the creation of
a threat of violence from the presence of large crowds. To avoid this
result, courts must conduct more than a cursory motive inquiry.
Id.
191 See Comment, supra note 47, at 91 ("The balancing test will be validly applied
to 'symbolic speech' situations only when the Court proceeds to thoroughly examine the substantiality of the alleged expressive element.").
192 See REDISH, supra note 10, at 125-26 (author suggests "that all governmental
regulations of expression [should] be subjected to a unified 'compelling interest'
187
188
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flourish. 93 The unveiling of messages advocating change must
be allowed if we are to remain a free society, even if a majority of
the population disagrees with the message.' 9 4 Nude dancing
should not be prohibited simply because certain people find its
message offensive or disagreeable. If nude dancing is suppressed, other forms of expression, that the general populous
does not deem frivolous, may not be far behind.
Carmen J. DiMaria
analysis"). See also Prygoski, supra note 89, at 34-35 (suggests an approach where
"the protection afforded different kinds of protected speech is the same, but the
level of protection is the one reserved for core First Amendment expression. This
is the only approach which gives adequate consideration to the marketplace of
ideas envisioned by the drafters of the [F]irst [A]mendment"); Oser, supra note 89,
at 361-67 (commentator suggests a test which takes access to alternative means of
communication into account in determination of free expression cases).
193 See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory Of The First Amendment, 72
YALE L. J. 877, 955 (1963) ("conditions in a modem democratic society demand
that a deliberate, affirmative, and even aggressive effort be made to support the
system of free expression").
194 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."). See also supra note 20 (for Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)).

